Competitive equilibrium (CE) is a fundamental concept in market economics. Its efficiency and fairness properties make it particularly appealing as a rule for fair allocation of resources among agents with possibly different entitlements. However, when the resources are indivisible, a CE might not exist even when there is one resource and two agents with equal incomes. Recently, Babaioff and Nisan and Talgam-Cohen (2017-2019) have suggested to consider the entire space of possible incomes, and check whether there exists a CE for almost all income-vectors-all income-space except a subset of measure zero. They proved various existence and non-existence results, but left open the cases of four goods and three or four agents with monotonically-increasing preferences. This paper proves non-existence in both these cases, thus completing the characterization of CE existence for almost all incomes in the domain of monotonically increasing preferences. Additionally, the paper provides a complete characterization of CE existence in the domain of monotonically decreasing preferences, corresponding to allocation of chores. On the positive side, the paper proves that CE exists for almost all incomes when there are four goods and three agents with additive preferences. The proof uses a new tool for describing a CE, as a subgame-perfect equilibrium of a specific sequential game. The same tool also enables substantially simpler proofs to the cases already proved by Babaioff et al. Additionally, this paper proves several strong fairness properties that are satisfied by any CE allocation, illustrating its usefulness for fair allocation among agents with different entitlements.
Introduction
Competitive equilibrium (henceforth CE) 1 is a fundamental concept in economics. It is interesting from both a descriptive and a normative viewpoint.
From a descriptive viewpoint, CE is a condition of stability in a market [62] . In the simple model called Fisher market [22, 25] , a single seller comes to the market with some items for sale. Several buyers with different preferences over bundles come to the market. Each buyer i carries a certain amount t i of fiat money called income. 2 CE is defined as a price-vector and a partition of the items among the buyers, such that the bundle of each buyer i costs at most t i and is weakly preferred by i to any other bundle that costs at most t i . The existence of a CE implies that the market can attain a "steady state" in which the total demand (i.e., the union of the preferred bundles of all the buyers) equals the supply.
From a normative viewpoint, CE can be considered a rule for fair allocation. In the basic setting, some items have to be allocated among several agents with equal entitlements. The goal is to find an allocation that is both weakly Pareto-efficient (no other allocation is strictly preferred by all agents) and envy-free (each agent weakly prefers his/her bundle to the bundle of every other agent). It is known that these two properties are satisfied by any CE allocation with equal incomes (CEEI) [47, 60] . In general, agents may have different entitlements, where the entitlement of agent i is represented by a positive number t i (for example, the items may belong to a firm of which each agent i owns t i shares). Then, the goal is to find an efficient allocation that satisfies some appropriate generalization of envyfreeness. For example, Reijnierse and Potters [54] define an allocation to be -envy-free (where is the vector of entitlements) if each agent i values his/her share as at least t i ∕t j of the share of agent j. 3 They show that, in any CE in which the income of each agent i equals his/her entitlement t i , the allocation is weakly Pareto-efficient and -envy-free.
When all items are divisible, whether the incomes are equal or different, a CE exists under very mild assumptions, both for homogeneous divisible resources [4, 45, 61] and for a heterogeneous resource such as a cake or a land-estate [54, 59, 63] . But when the items are indivisible, a CE might fail to exist even in very simple cases. For example, when there is one good and two agents with equal incomes, no CE exists: if the price is larger than the income, no agent can afford the good; otherwise, both agents can afford it, but only one agent can get it (Note that in this model money has no intrinsic value, so an agent always strictly prefers to buy an affordable good than to remain with no goods).
The example above could make us think that we cannot enjoy the benefits of CE when there are indivisible items. But a recent paper by Babaioff et al. [10] gives a new hope. They start by noticing that, in the case of two agents and one item, a CE fails to exist only when the incomes are exactly equal. So one can say that a CE exists for almost all incomes-the set of income-vectors in which a CE does not exist has a (Lebesgue) measure of zero.
They then ask whether this existence-for-almost-all-incomes extends to situations with more than one item and more than two agents. As with divisible items, the question is interesting from both a positive and normative viewpoint: whenever a CE exists, the CE allocation is weakly Pareto-efficient and has appealing fairness properties that can be seen
Contributions
The first contribution of this paper is a negative answer to the two open cases. For 4 goods and 3 or more agents, there exists a profile of monotonically-increasing preferences and a positive-measure subset of the income-space, in which a CE does not exist. 5 Thus, the existence of a CE for almost-all incomes for monotonically-increasing preferences is summarized by the following The effort to solve the open cases yielded a tool that may be useful in its own right: For the cases in which a CE exists (the cases marked by "Yes" in the above table), there is a sequential game, in which each agent in turn picks an item, and at least one subgameperfect equilibrium of the game is a CE.
Using this tool, the paper presents a new algorithm that finds a CE in the case of 4 goods and 3 agents with additive preferences. In contrast, the impossibility result for 4 goods and 4 agents holds even with additive preferences. The following table summarizes what is currently known about additive preferences: The paper also considers monotonically-decreasing preferences, when each agent prefers a set to all its supersets (the items in this case are called "bads" or "chores"). With two agents, there is an equivalence between goods-allocation and chores-allocation. It implies that both positive and negative results for allocating goods between two agents are true for chores too. With three or more agents, a CE for almost-all incomes might not exist with any number of chores, even with additive preferences. So the tables of results for chores are: An additional contribution of this paper is an analysis of various fairness properties that are satisfied by a CE allocation-properties that are natural generalizations of envy-freeness for agents with different entitlements (Sect. 3). It is shown that, in general, these new fairness properties are independent-none of them implies the other one (Appendix 1). An allocation satisfying these properties is called CE-fair. Every CE allocation is CE-fair, but the opposite is not true (Appendix 2).
In general, a CE-fair allocation may exist even when a CE does not exist. However, all the results on non-existence of CE in the present paper are proved using only the CEfairness properties. Therefore, they prove that even an allocation that is only CE-fair is not guaranteed to exist for almost all incomes.
Paper layout
The formal definitions are presented in Sect. 2. The fairness properties of CE are presented in Sect. 3. The sequential game used to find a CE for almost all incomes is presented in Sect. 4. The settings of three, four and five goods are analyzed in Sects. 5, 6 and 7 respectively. Allocation of chores is discussed in Sect. 8 . Related work is surveyed in Sect. 9 and future work ideas are presented in Sect. 10 . Some side-results are presented in the appendices.
Existence of CE
This paper focuses on the following definitions of existence of CE. Definition 2 Given integers n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1 and an income-vector ∈ ℝ n + , a CE exists for if for all preference-profiles in n,m , there is a price-vector and an allocation such that ( , ) is a CE given the income-vector .
Throughout, the term measure denotes the Lebesgue measure on ℝ n . Definition 3 Given integers n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1 , a CE exists for almost all incomes if the set of income-vectors for which no CE exists has a zero measure. 6 In other words: for almost all ∈ ℝ n + , for all preference-profiles in n,m , a CE exists. 7 To show existence by Definition 3, it is sufficient to show a finite set of equalities on the incomes such that a CE exists whenever none of these equalities is satisfied.
Note that Definition 3 allows the CE to depend on the income-vector. I.e, for every income-vector ∈ ℝ n + (except a set of measure zero), there may be a different CE allocation and price-vector.
In some proofs of existence, it will be convenient to assume that the preferences are strict. The following lemma shows that, regarding the existence of a CE, this assumption does not lose generality. Lemma 1 Given integers n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 1 and an income-vector ∈ ℝ n + , if a CE exists for for all strict preference-profiles in n,m , then a CE exists for for all preference-profiles in n,m .
Proof Consider a preference-profile that is not strict, so that for some agents i ∈ N and some pairs of bundles X, Y, both X ⪰ i Y and Y ⪰ i X hold. For each such agent, the relation ⪰ i can be made strict by arbitrarily removing either X ⪰ i Y or Y ⪰ i X . By assumption, there exists a CE ( , ) for the new profile. This ( , ) is a CE for the original profile too: Condition 1 holds trivially since it does not depend on the preferences. As for Condition 2, if p(Y) ≤ t i in the original profile then the same is true in the new profile, which implies that in the new profile Y ⪯ i X . Since the new profile did not add any new relations (only removed some), the relation Y ⪯ i X must hold in the original profile too. ◻ 6 The positive results in this paper hold even for a slightly stronger notion of existence, by which the set of income-vectors for which no CE exists is nowhere dense in ℝ n + . 7 One could consider alternative definitions by changing the order of quantifiers. Such alternative definitions are discussed in Appendix 3.
Fairness properties of competitive equilibria
It is well-known [21, 60] that, when all incomes are equal, a CE allocation is always envy-free-each agent weakly prefers his/her own bundle to the bundle of any other agent ( ∀i, j ∈ N ∶ X i ⪰ i X j ). Budish [28] introduced another fairness property that is always satisfied by CE with equal incomes: the CE allocation guarantees to each agent his/her 1-outof-n maximin share, which is the best bundle an agent can get by partitioning the items into n bundles and getting the worst one [28, Proposition 4] . This section explores the fairness properties of CE when the incomes are general-not necessarily equal.
Babaioff et al. [12, Proposition 3.3] have already generalized the result of Budish [28] by proving that, if an agent's income is at least a fraction l/d of the sum of all incomes (where l, d are positive integers), then a CE allocation guarantees him his l-out-of-d maximin-share, which is the best bundle he can get by partitioning the items into d bundles and getting the worst l of them (see formal definition below). This proposition supports the use of CE as a rule for fair allocation among agents with different entitlements: Given an allocation problem with an entitlement vector , construct a Fisher market with an income vector , find a CE ( , ) , and implement the allocation .
But CE has many more fairness implications, which are not captured by the proposition of Babaioff et al. [12] . For example, as shown below, a CE guarantees that, if Alice's income is at least as large as Bob's income, then Alice does not envy Bob; if it is at least as large as half Bob's income, then Alice does not envy "half" of Bob's bundle; and if it is at least as large as twice Bob's income, then Alice does not envy "twice" of Bob's bundle. These fairness properties are formalized and proved below.
Notation
This section focuses on a fixed CE allocation ( , ) and a specific agent, Alice. Her income is denoted by a, her preference-relation by ⪰ , and her bundle in the fixed CE by A.
For every bundle Z ⊆ M and integer d ≥ 1 , PARTITION(Z, d) denotes the set of all partitions of Z into d sub-bundles (some possibly empty).
For every bundle-vector = (Y 1 , … , Y d ) and integer l ∈ {1, … , d} , UNION( , l) is the set of all unions of exactly l different bundles from ,
For every bundle Z and integers l, d with 1 ≤ l ≤ d , the l-out-of-d-maximin-bundle of Z is denoted l d Z and defined as: 8 where max, min are based on Alice's preference-relation ≻.
In the above notation, Proposition 4 of Budish [28] says that: Proposition 3.3 of Babaioff et al. [12] says that, for every two integers 1 ≤ l ≤ d:
Remark 1 If Alice's preferences are strict, then l d Z is a unique bundle. Otherwise, there may be several maximizing bundles. The results in this section are specified, for simplicity, as though l d Z is a unique bundle. However, it is easy to see that they actually hold for any bundle satisfying the definition of l d Z , since Alice is indifferent among all these bundles.
First generalized fairness property
For every subset of agents K ⊆ N , if we consider only the subset of items �⋃ i∈K X i � , with the same prices that these items have in , the allocation still satisfies the two CE conditions. Hence, Proposition 3.3 of Babaioff et al. [12] implies that, for every subset of agents K ⊆ N which contains Alice, and for every two integers l, d with 1 ≤ l ≤ d:
Note that (P1) reduces to Proposition 3.3 of Babaioff et al. [12] when K = N , which reduces to Proposition 4 of Budish [28] when l = 1, d = n . For completeness, a stand-alone proof of (P1) (which holds for any K ⊆ N ) is presented below. Proposition 1 Every CE allocation satisfies (P1) for all K ⊆ N and integers 1 ≤ l ≤ d.
Proof
Let P be the price of the union at the right-hand side of (P1), P ∶= p �⋃ i∈K X i � . By CE Condition 1, for every i, t i ≥ p(X i ) . Therefore, ∑ i∈K t i ≥ P . By the proposition assumption, a ≥ l d ⋅ P . Consider a partition ∈ PARTITION( Moreover, if a ≥ (b + c) , then applying (P1) with K = {Bob, Carl} and l = d = 1 gives that Alice weakly prefers her bundle to the union of Bob and Carl's bundles. This is stronger than just saying that Alice does not envy Bob or Carl.
When all incomes are equal, a CE allocation guarantees Alice her pairwise-maximinshare (PMMS), as recently defined by Caragiannis et al. [29] . In our notation, the PMMS [16] . In our notation, the GMMS of Alice w.r.t. a subset K of agents is defined as 1 |K| (∪ i∈K X i ) . When the incomes are equal, a = 1 �K� ∑ i∈K t i , so Alice weakly prefers A to her GMMS w.r.t. any K. Remark 2 For each K ⊆ N , there are infinitely many pairs (l, d) that satisfy the condition of (P1), but only finitely many lead to "interesting" fairness guarantees (that are not implied by other guarantees). See Appendix 1, subsection "Maximin share with a bounded number of items", for details and the accompanying technical report 9 for more details.
Property (P1) can be instantiated with different subsets K of agents. In particular, it can be instantiated with a subset K that does not contain Alice, and with the subset K ∪ {Alice} . In general, these two instantiations are independent-none of them implies the other. See Appendix 1, subsection "Independence of (P1) instantiations with different bundles", for details.
Second generalized fairness property
When Alice's income is much larger than Bob's income ( a ≫ b ), property (P1) guarantees (by taking l = d = 1 ) that Alice prefers her bundle to Bob's bundle ( A ⪰ B ). However, intuitively it seems that, if Alice's entitlement is much larger than Bob's entitlement, she should get much more than just "at least B". For example, if a > 2b , Alice should get, in some sense, "at least twice B".
CE indeed implies such a guarantee. To define it formally, for every set of pairwise/ disjoint bundles Z 1 , … , Z k and pairs of integers (l 1 ,
where max, min are based on Alice's preference-relation ≻.
In words, it is the best bundle that Alice can guarantee to herself by partitioning each Z i into d i parts, letting an adversary pick d i − l i parts from each such partition, and taking the remaining l i parts from each partition. With this new definition it is possible to present a new fairness property. For every n pairs of integers (l 1 , d 1 ), … , (l n , d n ) , with 0 ≤ l i ≤ d i for all i ∈ {1, … , n}:
Note the structural similarity between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (P2): every term in the left-hand side (which is a number) corresponds to a term in the righthand side (which is a subset of items).
If a ≥ 2b , then a∕2 ≥ b so a ≥ a∕2 + b . Hence, (P2) implies: A ⪰ 1 2 A ⊔ B . I.e., Alice prefers her bundle to the best bundle she can get by dividing her current bundle into two parts, letting an adversary take away one part, and take Bob's entire bundle in addition to the other part.
Proposition 2 Every CE allocation satisfies (P2) for all pairs of integers
Proof By CE Condition 1, t i ≥ p(X i ) for all i ∈ N . Hence, by the left-hand side of (P2):
For every i ∈ {1, … , n} , for every partition ∈ PARTITION(X i , d i ) , the l i cheaper parts cost together at most l i d i p(X i ) . Therefore, there exists a bundle W i ∈ UNION( , l i ) whose price is at most
Remark 3
The two properties (P1) and (P2) are independent-none of them implies the other one. See Appendix 1, subsection "Independence of (P1) and (P2)", for details. In contrast, if Alice's preferences are not additive, then the property "Alice prefers the best half of A to B" is not necessarily satisfied by a CE. For example, suppose the incomes satisfy 2b < a < 3b , there are four goods w, x, y, z and the agents' preferences contain the following relations (where a comma means that the relation is irrelevant for the example):
The allocation (A, B) = (xyz, w) with prices (p x , p y , p z , p w ) = (a∕3, a∕3, a∕3, b) is a CE. But in any partition of A into two subsets, Alice prefers Bob's bundle to both subsets. Remark 5 It is possible to generalize (P2) even further. Replace each income t i in the lefthand side with a sum of some subset of the incomes (e.g. ∑ j∈K i t j for some subset K i ⊆ N ), and replace the corresponding bundle X i in the right-hand side with a union of the corresponding subset of the bundles ( ∪ j∈K i X j ). The resulting property is cumbersome to write in its full generality, but it is easy to apply in particular cases using the structural similarity between the two sides of (P2). For example, the following property holds in CE:
To conclude: competitive equilibrium can be seen as a rule for fair allocation. It guarantees, to each agent, a multitude of fairness properties that generalize, and strictly extend, the properties of both envy-freeness and maximin-share-guarantee.
The propositions in this section motivate the following definition.
Definition 4
Given an income-vector , an allocation is called CE-fair w.r.t. if for every agent, satisfies (P1) for every subset K ⊆ N and integers 1 ≤ l ≤ d , and satisfies (P2) for all pairs of integers 0 ≤ l i ≤ d i .
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that any CE allocation is CE-fair. However, the opposite is not true: there exist allocations that are CE-fair and even Pareto-efficient, but there are no price-vectors with which they form a CE. See Appendix 2 for details.
Picking-sequences with prices
This section presents a tool for constructing algorithms for finding competitive equilibria. Recall that, by Lemma 1, for proving existence of CE for all preference-profiles, it is sufficient to prove existence of CE for all strict preference-profiles. Therefore, in this and the following sections it is assumed that all preference relations are strict, so that the terms "agent i's most preferred item" or "agent j's worst pair" are uniquely defined.
Definition 5
A picking-sequence is a sequence of m agent-names. It is interpreted as a sequential game in which, at each step, the current agent in the sequence may pick a single item.
For example, with m = 3 items, a possible picking-sequence is ABA, which denotes a game in which Alice picks an item, then Bob picks an item, then Alice receives the last remaining item.
These games are analyzed below assuming complete information, i.e, the game, the preferences and the rationality of the agents are common knowledge. The following backward induction analysis [44, 65] is used. The m-th picker just picks the single remaining item. The m − 1-th picker picks one of the two remaining items that results in a bundle he prefers (given the items he already took). For every possible pair of remaining items, it is known what the m − 1-th picker is going to pick; based on this knowledge, the m − 2-th picker picks one of the three remaining items that results in a preferred final bundle for her. The analysis proceeds in this way back to step 1. Every sequence of picks that results from this process is called a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE). 10 For example, consider again the game ABA. In step 3 Alice takes the last remaining item. In step 2 Bob chooses the single item he prefers. Suppose w.l.o.g. that for Bob:
x ≻ y ≻ z , then Bob will never take z. Alice knows this, and realizes that her bundle will be either xz or yz. So in step 1, Alice decides which of these two bundles she prefers, and picks accordingly. For example, if for Alice: yz ≻ xz , then in the 1st step Alice picks y. Then, Bob picks x and Alice gets z, and the final allocation is yz, x. In this case there is a second SPE, in which Alice picks z in the 1st step and gets y in the 3rd step; the allocation in both SPE is the same.
Definition 6
(a) A picking-sequence-with-prices (pixep for short) is a picking-sequence in which a price is attached to each position. The interpretation is that, whenever an agent picks an item, the corresponding price is attached to that item. (b) Let S be a pixep and Q a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the sequential game defined by S. The pair (S, Q) is called an execution of the pixep S. The allocation induced by this execution is denoted by (S, Q) , and the induced price-vector by (S, Q).
For example, with three items, a possible pixep is:
which means that the first item picked by Alice is priced at 4, the item picked by Bob is priced at 2, and the last item received by Alice is priced at 1. A pixep can be seen as a shorthand for an allocation rule; (*) is a shorthand for the rule: "Give Alice her most preferred pair from the two pairs that contain Bob's worst item; price Alice's two items at 1 and 4; give Bob the remaining item and price it at 2".
Using pixeps to find a competitive equilibrium
The main goal in designing a pixep is to find a CE.
Definition 7
Let S be a pixep of length m and ∈ ℝ n + an income-vector. S implements a CE given income-vector if whenever the income-vector of the agents is , for every preference-profile in n,m , there exists a SPE Q of the sequential game defined by S, such that the allocation (S, Q) with the price-vector (S, Q) are a CE.
Our goal now is to develop pixeps that implement a CE in various settings. Although there are finitely many sequences, there are infinitely many prices, so exhaustively searching the space of all pixeps is infeasible. Several heuristics for trimming the search-space are presented below. The heuristics are exemplified on the pixep below, where there are three agents: Alice Bob and Carl, with incomes a, b, c.
TCE Cohe first heuristic is related to ndition 1.
(H1) For each agent i that appears at least once in the sequence, the sum of prices that appear below i equals t i .
For example, pixep (**) satisfies (H1) iff p 1 + p 4 = a and p 2 + p 3 = b . (H1) Guarantees that, in any outcome ( , ) of the pixep, p(X i ) = t i for all i ∈ N , so CE Condition 1 is satisfied. In fact, Condition 1 is weaker and allows p(X i ) ≤ t i . However, as observed by Babaioff et al. [12, Claim 1] , every CE can be converted into an incomeexhausting CE (in which all agents with non-empty bundles exhaust their incomes) by increasing the price of an arbitrary item in each agent's bundle until the bundle's price equals the agent's income. So (H1) is without loss of generality-it does not miss useful pixeps.
The next two heuristics are related to CE Condition 2.
(H2) The sequence of prices should be decreasing, and strictly-decreasing whenever the picking-sequence switches between agents. (H3) The last price must be strictly larger than the income of any agent who does not appear in the sequence.
The (H2) heuristic ensures that no agent can afford to switch the item he picked in his turn with a preferred item picked by another agent in a previous turn. This is a necessary condition: suppose (H2) is violated, and suppose all agents have the same additive preferences. Then there is a unique SPE, in which each agent in turn picks the remaining item with the highest value. If (H2) is violated, then this SPE violates CE Condition 2. 11 The (H3) heuristic ensures that an agent who is allocated an empty bundle cannot afford a non-empty bundle. It is necessary for satisfying CE Condition 2. Hence, both (H2) and (H3), too, are without loss of generality.
Henceforth, only pixeps satisfying (H1, H2, H3) are considered.
Domination of bundles
Given an execution (S, Q), a domination relation is defined on bundles based on the positions of items in the sequence. Given two different bundles X ≠ Y , say that X is dominated by Y if there exists an injection f ∶ X → Y such that, for each item x ∈ X , f(x) appears (weakly) earlier than x in the execution (S, Q). For example, in a sequence of four items, the pair of items in positions #1 and #4:
• Is dominated by the pair of items #1 and #2, as well as by the triplet of items #1 #3 #4;
• Dominates the pair of items #3 and #4, as well as the singleton containing item #1;
• Is unrelated to the triplet of items #2 #3 and #4 (none of them dominates the other).
Given an execution (S, Q) and an agent i, the dominating bundles/dominated bundles/ unrelated bundles of i are the bundles that dominate/are dominated by/are unrelated to X i , respectively. CE Condition 2 can be verified for these three types of bundles separately.
Lemma 2 Suppose a pixep S satisfies (H1, H2, H3). Then in any execution (S, Q), no agent can afford a dominating bundle.
Proof Consider an agent i ∈ N . If X i is empty, then (H3) implies that any non-empty bundle costs more than t i . Otherwise, in any bundle dominating X i , each item appears either at the same location or earlier than a corresponding item in X i . Moreover, by definition a dominating bundle is different than X i so it has at least one item selected by a different agent than i. Therefore, (H2) implies that it is costs more than p(X i ) . (H1) implies that p(X i ) = t i . Hence, i cannot afford a more expensive bundle. Proof Consider a bundle Y dominated by X i . By definition, there is an injection f ∶ Y → X i such that, for each item y ∈ Y , f(y) appears (weakly) earlier than y in the execution (S, Q).
Lemma 4 Suppose in a pixep S all the turns of agent i are in a single contiguous sequence. Then in any SPE (S, Q), agent i does not want any dominated bundle.
Proof Suppose the turns of i are a contiguous sequence of length k. Then, the unique best strategy of i is to pick the best k-tuple from among the items remaining on the table. This tuple is preferred by agent i to any dominated k-tuple. By Lemma 3, it is preferred by i to any dominated bundle. ◻
Example 1
In both pixeps (*) and (**), Lemma 4 is applicable to Bob. In (*), he picks the best remaining item and obviously does not want the other item; in (**), he picks the best remaining pair and does not want any other remaining pair or singleton. Lemmata 2, 3, 4 imply that, to verify that a given pixep implements a CE (by Definition 7), it is sufficient to check the unrelated bundles of each agent, and the dominated bundles of agents with non-contiguous turns. Moreover, it is sufficient to check dominated bundles with the same size as the agent's bundle. Moreover, (H3) implies that it is not needed to check any bundle for an agent who does not appear in the pixep.
Warm-up: three goods
As a warm-up, this section shows how to design pixeps implementing CE for the case of three goods and any number of agents. Babaioff et al. [11, Proposition 3 .1] already proved that in this case a CE exists for almost all incomes, but the algorithm presented here (Algorithm 1) is more concise and contains less cases (see Appendix 6 for a detailed comparison).
It can be assumed that all incomes are different, since this assumption removes from the income-space a subset of measure zero. So assume w.l.o.g. that a > b > c > all other incomes.
The following paragraphs examine some picking-sequences and check if they can be made into a pixep that implements a CE. Consider first the sequence AAA , giving Alice all three items. (H3) implies that the last price must be b + for some > 0 . (H2) implies that the second price must be at least b + , so we set it to b + . (H1) implies that the sum of all prices must equal a, so we set the first price to a − 2b − 2 . (H2) implies that
For brevity, from now on the will be omitted from the notation: instead of b + , I will write b + , instead of a − 2b − 2 I will write (a − 2b) −− , etc. So the above discussion can be summarized as:
The interpretation of this notation is: "If a > 3b , then there exists > 0 such that the sequence AAA with prices a − 2b − 2 , b + , b + implements a CE". It is easy to find such an by solving a set of linear inequalities. 12 As a second example, consider the sequence AAB. (H1) implies that the last price is b, which is by assumption larger than c, so (H3) is satisfied too. (H2) implies that the second price should be more than b so set it to b + ; (H1) implies that the first price should be (a − b) − , and (H2) then implies that a − b ≥ b ++ . To summarize:
This pixep implements a CE whenever a > 2b . To see this, consider Alice first. Her only dominating bundle is the set of all three items; as claimed by Lemma 2, Alice cannot afford it. She has many dominated bundles, for example, one containing Bob's item and one of her own items; by Lemma 4, Alice does not prefer any of these bundles to her own. There are no unrelated bundles, so the allocation is a CE for Alice. For Bob the situation is opposite: his only dominated bundle is the empty bundle, which he of course does not want. He has many dominating bundles, which by Lemma 2 he cannot afford. He has no unrelated bundles, so the allocation is CE for Bob too.
Remark 6
When a > 3b , the two above pixeps, based on AAA and AAB, both implement a CE. This raises the question which CE is "better". Intuitively, if Alice's income is much larger than Bob's, it seems fairer to give all items to Alice, while if the difference is not so high, it seems fairer to leave the last item to Bob. However, these intuitions are not supported by the definition of CE. From the point-of-view of CE, which is the one taken in this paper, both pixeps are equally reasonable. Moreover, the allocations yielded by both pixeps satisfy all the fairness properties described in Sect. 3. The question of selecting a single CE remains for future work.
As a third example, consider the sequence ABC. (H1) implies that the prices must be a, b, c, and by assumption a > b > c > all other incomes, so (H2,H3) are satisfied. Lemma 4 is applicable for all three agents, so to verify CE it is sufficient to consider unrelated bundles. Carl and Bob do not have unrelated bundles: for Carl, all bundles are dominating, except the empty bundle which is dominated. For Bob, all bundles are dominating, except the empty bundle and Carl's bundle which are dominated. For Alice, the empty bundle and all singleton bundles are dominated, the bundle of all items is dominating, and the pairs containing her own item are dominating too. Hence, Alice has a single unrelated bundlethe one containing items #2 and #3. To ensure that Alice cannot afford that bundle, it is sufficient to require that a < b + c :
Finally, consider the sequence ABA. To satisfy (H1,H3), set the prices to
Here no agent has unrelated bundles. Lemma 4 implies that Bob does not want a dominated bundle. It remains to verify that Alice does not want a dominated bundle of size 2. The only such bundle is the pair of the items picked last. Suppose w.l.o.g. that Bob's ranking of singletons is: x ≻ y ≻ z . Then Bob never picks z so Alice gets either xz or yz. If for Alice xz ≻ yz then she certainly picks x first, so she prefers her bundle over the dominated bundle yz. If for Alice yz ≻ xz then she has two options: pick y first and get z last, or pick z first and get y last. Both options lead to the same final allocation. In the first option she prefers her bundle to the dominated pair xz, while in the second option she might prefer the dominated pair xy. However, to prove the existence of a CE, it is sufficient to prove that there exists a SPE in which the allocation satisfies the CE conditions, so it can be assumed that Alice picks the first option. 13 The conditions of the last two pixeps, ABC and ABA, cover all the income space except the hyperplane a = b + c , which has a measure of zero in ℝ n + . Thus, the following theorem is proved:
Theorem 1 When there are m = 3 goods, for almost all incomes, for all monotonicallyincreasing preference-profiles, a CE exists and can be found by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Competitive Equilibrium with m = 3 items. The algorithm works in almost all the income space, i.e, for all income-vectors (a, b, c, . . . ) in which a > b > c > . . . and a + b = c.
6 Four goods Algorithm 2 Competitive Equilibrium with m = 4 items and n = 2 agents. Works for
2. If a < 2b then play the sequential game below:
Alice may choose:
Else, Bob may choose:
Algorithm 2 uses a higher-level sequential game-a game in which agents may choose between different pixeps. Definition 7 naturally extends to this higher-level game: it implements a CE given income-vector if whenever the income-vector of the agents is , for every preference-profile in n,m , there exists a SPE Q of this game such that the resulting allocation with the resulting price-vector are a CE.
Theorem 2 When there are n = 2 agents and m = 4 goods, for almost all incomes, for all monotonically-increasing preference-profiles, a CE exists and can be found by Algorithm 2.
Proof The case a > 2b is handled by the sequence AABA:
All three requirements on the price-sequence (H1, H2, H3) are clearly satisfied. No agent has any unrelated bundles. By Lemma 4, Bob does not want a dominated bundle. It only remains to check that Alice does not want a dominated bundle of size 3. This can be verified similarly to the case ABA in the previous section. There exists a SPE in which Bob's worst item is picked (by Alice) at the last step. Alice receives the best of the three triplets that contain this item, so she prefers it to any dominated triplet. The case a < 2b is more complicated. It requires letting agents choose between different pixeps. This leads to the following three-step sequential game.
Step #1 Alice may choose the following pixep based on ABAB:
Step #2 If Alice does not choose ABAB, then Bob may choose the following pixep based on BAAA :
Step #3 If Bob does not choose BAAA , then we play the following pixep based on AABB:
To understand the design of this algorithm, it is useful to think of a special case in which the preferences are additive and identical; then, a bundle given to one agent should be more expensive than a bundle given to the other agent iff it is more valuable. Suppose w ≻ x ≻ y ≻ z , so the items are picked in the order w, x, y, z. Then step 1 handles the case w ≻ xz , step 2 handles the case xz ≻ w ≻ yz , and step 3 handles the remaining case yz ≻ w.
Proving that the same algorithm works for general preferences requires analysis using backward induction. Rename the items such that Bob's best item is w, and for Alice:
In Step 3, Alice gets her best pair and Bob gets its complement. By Lemma 4 no agent wants a dominated bundle. Alice's unrelated bundles are all triplets, and Alice cannot afford even the cheapest of them, since a∕2 + b > a . Bob's unrelated bundles are all singletons, and Bob can afford them. But, if he wanted a singleton, he could choose BAAA in the previous step and get his best singleton (w). So in step 3 it is safe to assume that Bob does not want an unrelated bundle.
In Step 2, Bob has to choose between w (his preferred singleton), and the complement to Alice's best pair. There are three cases: (a) If Alice's best pair is xy or xz or yz, then the complement contains w so Bob certainly prefers AABB. (b) Otherwise, Alice's best pair is wx and its complement is yz; if for Bob yz ≻ w , then again he prefers AABB. (c) Only if Alice's best pair is wx and for Bob w ≻ yz , does Bob choose BAAA . In the latter case, Bob's bundle is w. There exists a SPE in which Alice chooses her three items in the order: x, y, z. Then, Bob cannot afford xy or xz since they cost more than b. The only unrelated bundle he can afford is yz. However, in case (c) Bob prefers w to yz, so Bob does not want any unrelated bundle. Alice can afford only three unrelated bundles-w and wy and wz. However, if she wants any of these, she could choose in the previous step ABAB and pick w first; this would guarantee her at least wy. So there exists a SPE in which, in step 2, Alice does not want any unrelated bundle that she can afford.
In Step 1, in cases (a-b) above, Alice never chooses ABAB, since she can get her best pair by waiting for Step 3. In case (c), Alice chooses ABAB iff she prefers the pair she is going to get over the triplet xyz; this pair must contain w, so it can be assumed that if ABAB is played, Alice picks w first. 14 Now, Bob has only one unrelated bundle w, which he cannot afford since a > b . Alice has one unrelated bundle xyz, which by assumption she does not want.
It remains to check the dominated bundles in the case ABAB. Alice receives a pair that she prefers over xyz, so she prefers it to every pair contained in xyz. Her only other dominated pair contains w and the item picked last. But if Alice wanted this pair, she could have picked this item in her before-last turn. From Bob's point of view, the relevant sequence is BAB, which is analogous to the sequence ABA analyzed in the previous section. Therefore, Bob too does not want any dominated pair. ◻
Three agents with general monotonically-increasing preferences
In this subsection there are four items and three agents-Alice Bob and Carl-with incomes a > b > c.
In the conference version of this paper [55] , I presented an algorithm using pixeps for this case, and claimed that it implements a CE for almost all incomes. This was a mistake: the algorithm works only when the agents have additive preferences (see Sect. 6.3 below). The error was in one pixep that was supposed to handle a specific range of incomes; by focusing on this specific range, I found a specific preference-profile for which no CE exists. 15 Theorem 3 When there are n = 3 agents and m ≥ 4 goods, there is a monotonicallyincreasing preference-profile and a positive-measure subset of the income-space, where no allocation is CE-fair, hence no CE exists. 14 If Alice picks w first, then her bundle is either wy (if Bob picks x first) or wx (otherwise). If Alice picks y or z first, then her bundle cannot be better for her than wy, so we can assume she does not do this. If Alice picks x first, then Bob picks w second, because in case (c) he prefers w to yz; but then Alice's bundle is contained in xyz, so it is worse for her than wy. 15 To decrease the chances that this example, too, has a mistake, I wrote a Python program that, given preferences and incomes, exhaustively checks all allocations, and for each allocation, looks for CE prices using linear programming. I used the program to verify this and the other non-existence results in this paper. The code is available here: https ://githu b.com/erels gl/indiv isibl e-compe titiv e-equil ibriu m.
Proof Consider first the case of m = 4 goods. Call the agents Alice Bob and Carl and denote their incomes by a, b, c. Consider the income subspace defined by the following inequalities:
It has a positive measure since it is open and contains e.g. the point (20, 11, 8) .
There are four items denoted by: w, x, y, z. The agents' preferences contain the following relations (Carl's preferences are irrelevant for the proof):
Suppose by contradiction that a CE-fair allocation exists. Applying (P1) to Carl gives: so Carl must get at least one item.
CE-fairness implies that Bob must not envy Carl, so he must get at least one item too. Applying (P1) to Alice gives:
so Alice must get at least two items, and these must be wx or wy or wz (since Alice prefers these three pairs to their complements). So Alice must get exactly 2 items, Bob exactly 1 and Carl exactly 1. If Alice gets wx, then Bob gets y or z. In both cases (P1) is violated for him, since:
If Alice gets wy or wz, then (P1) is violated for her, since:
◻ Consider now the case m > 4 . Intuitively, more items can only make it harder to find a CE. The following lemma formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 5 Let n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2 be integers and ∈ ℝ n + an income-vector.
(a) If there exists a CE w.r.t. for all preference-profiles in n,m+1 , then there exists a CE w.r.t. for all preference-profiles in n,m . (b) If there exists a CE-fair allocation w.r.t. for all preference-profiles in n,m+1 , then there exists a CE-fair allocation w.r.t. for all preference-profiles in n,m .
Proof Given a preference-profile with m items, construct a preference-profile with m + 1 items by adding a "low-value item", denoted by z. "Low-value" means that, for every agent i ∈ N , and for every two bundles X and Y which do not contain z, Y ⪰ i X ∪ {z} in the new profile if and only if Y ⪰ i X in the original profile. In other words, adding the new item z does not affect the relative order between bundles in the original profile. Part (a) By assumption, there exists a CE in the new profile. Denote it by ( , ) . Suppose w.l.o.g. that in this CE item z is given to agent 1. Define a CE ( , ) in the original profile, where is identical to except that z is removed, i.e.: Y j ∶= X j for all j ≠ 1 , and Y 1 ∶= X 1 ⧵ {z} . Then ( , ) is a CE: All agents except 1 have the same bundle and see the same allocation and prices, so both CE conditions hold for them. As for agent 1, the first CE condition holds since p(
Part (b) By assumption, there exists a CE-fair allocation in the new profile. Let be an allocation derived from by removing z from the bundle of the agent who received it. Then is CE-fair: in both (P1) and (P2), the left-hand sides (the conditions on the incomes) do not change since the income-vector is the same. In the right-hand sides, removing z from either side of the inequality does not affect the maximin-share bundles and the order relation between the bundles, since z is a low-value item. ◻ Combining Lemma 5 with the proof for m = 4 completes the proof of Theorem 3 for any m ≥ 4.
Three agents with additive preferences
This subsection presents an algorithm, based on pixeps, for finding a CE for almost all incomes, when there are m = 4 goods and n = 3 agents with additive preferences. Its proof of correctness uses the following lemma, which extends Lemma 4.
Lemma 6
Let i be an agent with additive preferences. Suppose in a pixep S, the turns of agent i are arranged in a contiguous sequence, after it a single turn of another agent j, and then another turn of agent i. Then there exists a SPE (S, Q) in which agent i does not want any dominated bundle.
Proof Suppose the contiguous sequence is of length k − 1 , so all in all agent i is entitled to k items. Let's say that agent i picks in order, if in each turn he picks his most valuable remaining item. By additivity, picking in order guarantees the agent at least his 2nd-best k-tuple from the set of items remaining on the table when his first turn arrives. Therefore only the two following cases are possible:
Case #1: Agent i has a strategy by which, in SPE, he gets the best k-tuple of remaining items. Then there exists a SPE in which agent i plays this strategy. Since any dominated bundle contains at most k remaining items, agent i does not want any such bundle.
Case #2: Agent i does not have such a strategy. Then, there exists a SPE in which he picks in order and gets the 2nd-best k-tuple of remaining items. When picking in order, all dominated bundles have a smaller value for agent i. ◻
Remark 7
In Lemma 6 there is a "gap" of 1 in the agent's turns. The lemma no longer holds with a gap of 2. For example, consider three agents with additive preferences satisfying:
Consider the picking-sequence ABCA. There is only one SPE: the items are picked in the order yxzw, and Alice's bundle is wy (if Alice picks any other item instead of y in her first turn, she gets wz or xz, both of which are worse for her than wy). Now Alice prefers the dominated bundle wx. ◻ Theorem 4 When there are m = 4 goods and n = 3 agents, for almost all incomes, for all additive monotonically-increasing preference-profiles, a CE exists and can be found by Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Implementing Competitive Equilibrium with m = 4 items and n = 3 additive agents with incomes a > b > c.
4. If 2b > a > b + c and 2b > a + c (implies b > 2c, a > 3c) then:
If b + c > a > 2c and 2c > b then play:
6. If b + c > a > 2c and b > 2c then play:
7. If 2c > a then play the sequential game below:
Proof First, it is easy to check that all pixeps satisfy (H1,H2,H3); in particular, all pricesequences are decreasing. Moreover, for all agents, the turns are either contiguous or contiguous with a single gap. Hence, by Lemmatas 4 and 6, no agent wants a dominated bundle. Moreover, Carl has no unrelated bundles. It only remains to check the unrelated bundles of Alice and Bob. Ranges 1, 2 and 3 are straightforward: no agent can afford an unrelated bundle. 16 Range 4 is analyzed similarly to range 2 in Algorithm 2. Note that the pickingsequences in both ranges are the same-only the prices are different. This means that the strategic behavior of the agents is exactly the same in both ranges. The reason is that, in the Fisher market model, money is used only to purchase items in the market, and has no value outside the market. Therefore, the preferences of the agents depend only on the bundles that they receive, and not on the prices.
In Range 5, In both steps, Bob cannot afford any unrelated bundle. To analyze Alice's strategy, rename the items such that Bob's best item is w and Alice's best pair without w is xy. Then Alice chooses ABCB iff she prefers w to xy.
If she chooses ABCB, she gets w, does not want xy (or any other pair without w), and cannot afford a triplet.
If she chooses BAAC , she gets xy, does not want w, and cannot afford any unrelated pair.
To analyze Range 6, rename the items such that Bob's best item is w, Alice's best items besides w are x, y, and for Bob x > y.
In the last step BAAC , Bob picks w and Alice picks xy and the allocation is (xy, w, z). Alice can afford only one unrelated bundle-the singleton w. But if she wanted it, she could have chosen it in the first step ABBC. Bob can afford only one unrelated bundle-the cheaper of xz, yz. There exists a SPE where Alice picks x before y; then, Bob can afford only yz. However, we get to BAAC only if Bob prefers w to the pair he could get in ABAB, which must be one of xy, xz, yz and not the worst one. So by choosing ABAB Bob could get at least yz. But he chose otherwise, hence he prefers w.
In the second step ABAB, Alice cannot afford even her cheapest unrelated bundle (triplet) since b + c > a . Bob can afford only one unrelated bundle-a singleton. But Bob chooses ABAB only if he prefers the pair he is going to get to his best singleton w.
For analyzing the first step ABBC, note that in ABBC Alice gets a singleton, while in ABAB Alice can get the same singleton plus another item. Therefore, Alice chooses ABBC only if she knows that Bob would choose BAAC . By choosing ABBC, she indicates that she prefers her best item over the best pair that does not contain this item. Therefore, she does not want any unrelated pair. Additionally, she cannot afford any triplet. Bob cannot afford even his cheapest unrelated bundle (singleton).
In Range 7, in both steps, Bob cannot afford any unrelated bundle.
To analyze Alice's strategy, rename the items such that Bob's best item is w, and Carl's worst item besides w is z.
In the last step, Bob picks w and Carl picks x or y, so Alice can get the best of xz, yz. She can afford only one unrelated singleton (w), but if she wants it she can choose ABCB in the first step.
In the first step necessarily Alice prefers w to best(xz, yz), so w is her best singleton and she picks it. Since b + c > a , Alice can afford only two unrelated pairs-the ones containing the last item. There exists a SPE in which this last item is z. So Alice can afford only xz, yz. But if Alice wanted one of these, she could have waited to the last step.
Finally, it is easy to check that the seven ranges handled by Algorithm 3 cover all the income space except a finite number of hyperplanes (corresponding to the equalities a = b, b = c, a = 2b + c, a = 2b, a = b + c, a + c = 2b, a = 2c, 2c = b ). Therefore, a CE exists for almost all incomes. ◻
Four or more agents
In this subsection there are four goods and four (or more) agents. Intuitively, one would expect an analogue of Lemma 5, which would say that a CE is less likely to exist when there are more agents. Such a lemma, combined with the impossibility result of Theorem 3, would imply impossibility for any m ≥ 4 and n ≥ 4.
However, so far I could not prove such a general lemma. In fact, in some specific instances, a CE may be more likely to exist when there are more agents-see Appendix 5. Therefore, the non-existence for n ≥ 4 agents must be proved explicitly. An additional benefit of the proof below is that it is valid also for additive agents. It is open and contains e.g. the point (160, 130, 90, 66, …) , so it has a positive measure. There are four items denoted by w, x, y, z. The agents' preferences contain the following relations:
Note that these preferences are additive. For example, Alice's valuations for w, x, y, z can be 11, 7, 5, 3, Bob's valuations can be 9, 7, 6, 8 and Carl's valuations can be 7, 9, 8, 6. The preferences of Dana, as well as of the n − 4 agents with the lower incomes (if any), are irrelevant for the proof.
Suppose by contradiction that a CE-fair allocation exists. In any allocation, at most four agents can get non-empty bundles, and by CE-fairness (P1), these must be the four agents
with the highest incomes. Denote their bundles by A, B, C, D. Then, the CE-fairness properties imply the following.
Dana gets no item
If she gets an item, then by envy-freeness (which follows from (P1)), the three higher-income agents must also get an item: Alice must get w (her best item), Bob must get z (his best remaining item), Carl must get x (his best remaining item), and Dana gets y. But now (P1) is violated for Alice, since for her:
Bob and Carl get at most one item
If any of them gets more than one item, then (P1) is violated for Dana, since she gets an empty bundle, and for her:
Bob and Carl get exactly one item
If one of them (say, Carl) gets no items, then Alice gets at least 3 items, and (P1) is violated for Carl, since:
Alice gets w plus another item
If she does not get w, then some lower-income agent gets it, so by envy-freeness (P1), Alice must get a bundle that she prefers to w. Such a bundle must contain both x and y. Hence Carl (who gets at most one item) can get either w or z. But now (P1) is violated for Carl, since for him: So Bob gets a single item, and it is worse for him than w. But now (P1) is violated for Bob, since for him: This is because A ∪ C can be partitioned into w plus a pair, and Bob prefers both of these parts to his single item. ◻
Five or more goods
In this section there are five goods. Babaioff et al. [11, Theorem 3.5 ] already showed that, with two agents, there may exist a subset of the income-space with a positive measure in which no CE exists. For completeness, the theorem below provides an alternative proof that uses the same income range and almost the same preferences, but is based only on the CE-fairness properties (P1) and (P2). Thus, it shows that even a CE-fair allocation without the other properties of CE (such as weak Pareto-efficientity) may be unattainable in a subset of positive measure. Moreover, the proof is extended to any number of agents.
Theorem 6 With n ≥ 2 agents and m ≥ 5 goods, there exist a monotonically-increasing preference-profile and a subset of the income-space with a positive measure, for which no CE-fair allocation exists (hence no CE exists).
Proof By Lemma 5, it is sufficient to prove the theorem for m = 5 goods. Since there are 5 goods, we can assume w.l.o.g. that there are at most 5 agents, since if there are more agents, the n − 5 lower-income agents necessarily get an empty bundle in any CE-fair allocation. 17 Denote the two highest incomes by a, b, and the other incomes by c, d, e (if there are less than 5 agents, then e = 0 ; if there are less than 4 agents, then in addition d = 0 ; if there are less than 3 agents, then in addition c = 0 ). Consider the income subspace defined by:
There are five goods: v, w, x, y, z. The preferences of Alice and Bob (the two highestincome agents) contain the following relations:
The preferences of the other agents, if any, are irrelevant for the proof.
Suppose by contradiction that a CE-fair allocation exists. Denote the bundles of the two highest-income agents by A, B, and the other bundles by C, D, E (if there are less than 5 agents, then E = � ; if there are less than 4 agents, then in addition D = � ; if there are less than 3 agents, then in addition C = �).
Applying (P1) to Alice gives:
(the rightmost bundle is at least xyz by the 2-partition (vw, xyz)). We now check Alice's possible bundles by order of Alice's preferences, from xyz upwards. If A = xyz , then B ∪ C ∪ D ∪ E = vw and (P1) is violated for Alice, since for her
(the rightmost bundle contains one item from B ∪ C ∪ D ∪ E and one item from A, so it is one of vx, vy, vz, wx, wy, wz; Bob prefers all these to xyz, which contains B).
If A is vwx or vwy or vwz, then B is contained in yz or xz or xy. But then (P1) is violated for Bob, since for him:
If the second conjecture in Appendix 5 were proved, then we could assume w.l.o.g. that there are n = 2 agents.
(the rightmost bundle is at least v by the 3-partition (xyz, v, w) ). Finally, if Alice gets four or more items, then (P1) is violated for Bob, since for him:
(the rightmost bundle contains a triplet, and Bob prefers all triplets to all singletons). ◻
Allocation of chores
So far it was assumed that all items are goods, or equivalently, that all preferences are monotonically-increasing. In this section it is assumed that all items are chores (also called: bads), or equivalently, that all preferences are monotonically-decreasing-an agent always prefers a set to its supersets. Following the economic literature [19] , in a chore-allocation problem, each agent has a negative income, so the set of all possible income-vectors for n agents is ∈ ℝ n − . Similarly, the prices of all chores are negative. A CE is a pair ( , ) , where is a vector of m negative numbers and is an allocation. The CE conditions are defined exactly as for goods, namely: Condition 1. The price of an agent's bundle (which is a negative number) is at most the agent's income (which is a negative number too):
Condition 2. Each agent's bundle is the best bundle he/she can afford with his/her income. Formally, for every bundle Y ⊆ M:
Condition 1 implies that each agent must do chores whose total price drops below his income. This means that agents with a smaller (= more negative) income need to do more chores, or less desirable chores. Thus, CE can be seen as a rule for dividing chores fairly among agents with different liabilities, where an agent with liability |t i | (a positive number) has an income of t i (a negative number).
One implication of Condition 1 for chores (which does not hold for goods) is that each agent must do at least one chore. This means that a CE does not exist if there are less chores than agents ( m < n).
Properties (P1) and (P2) do not use the sign of the income or prices. Therefore, Propositions 1 and 2 hold equally well with chores, and any CE allocation is CE-fair. In particular, a CE with equal incomes is still envy-free and satisfies the 1-out-of-n maximin-share guarantee.
Two agents
Intuitively, with two agents, allocating chores is equivalent to allocating exemptions from chores. An exemption from chore is a good; therefore, chores-allocation is equivalent to goods-allocation. 18 This subsection proves this intuition formally.
Given a preference relation ⪰ i , define its dual preference relation, ⪰ * i , as a relation that satisfies, for every two bundles X, Y:
Note that ⪰ i is monotonically-increasing iff ⪰ * i is monotonically-decreasing, so ⪰ i represents preferences on goods iff ⪰ * i represents preferences on chores.
Theorem 7 Consider the following two allocation problems, defined on the same set M with |M| ≥ 2:
• Goods-allocation problem, defined as allocating the items in M between two agents with monotonically-increasing preferences ⪰ A , ⪰ B and positive incomes (a, b); • Chores-allocation problem, defined as allocating the items in M between two agents with monotonically-decreasing preferences ⪰ * A , ⪰ * B and negative incomes (−b, −a).
Then, there exists a CE in the goods-allocation problem, if-and-only-if there exists a CE in the chores-allocation problem.
Proof Throughout the proof, assume w.l.o.g. that a ≥ b. Goods CE ⟹ Chores CE Let ( , (A, B) ) be a CE in the goods-allocation problem. Transform this CE in several steps.
Step 1. Ensure that both bundles are non-empty. Alice's bundle A obviously cannot be empty, since otherwise Alice envies Bob. If Bob's bundle B is empty (so A = M ), let x ∈ M be a good for which Alice prefers M ⧵ {x} to all bundles with m − 1 goods. Then,
This ( � , (A � , B � ) ) is still a CE in the goods-allocation problem. Proof: CE condition 1 holds, since p � (A � ) = rp(A � ) = a and p � (B � ) = b . CE condition 2 holds for Alice, since she prefers A ′ to all bundles except M , and she cannot afford M . CE condition 2 holds for Bob too, since in the original price-vector , he could not afford any item. In the new pricevector ′ , the prices of all items except x are higher (they are multiplied by r ≥ 1 ), so Bob certainly cannot afford them.
Step 2. Ensure that both agents exhaust their incomes. Once both bundles are nonempty, if the price of an agent's bundle is less than the agent's income, arbitrarily increase prices of items in his/her bundle until the total bundle price equals his/her income. The CE conditions are still satisfied. To ease notation, denote the new CE by the same notation ( � , (A � , B � )).
Step 3. Construct a CE for the chore-allocation problem. Allocate B ′ to Alice, A ′ to Bob, and set the price-vector to − � .
This (− � , (B � , A � ) ) is a CE in the chore-allocation problem. Proof: CE condition 1 obviously holds, since −p � (B � ) = −b and −p � (A � ) = −a . To prove that CE condition 2 holds for Alice, it is sufficient to prove that every bundle that Alice prefers over B ′ by her dual preference-relation, costs more than −b . Indeed, let X be a bundle such that X ≻ * A B � . By definition of the dual preference relation, Chores CE ⟹ Goods CE. Let (− , (B, A) ) be a CE in the chores allocation problem. Normalize it as in Step 2 above, so that −q(B) = −b and −q(A) = −a . This ( , (A, B) ) is a CE in the goods allocation problem. The proof is entirely analogous to the proof in step 3 above. ◻ Theorem 7 implies that the existence result of Sect. 6.1 and the non-existence result of Sect. 7 are true for chores too. So CE exists for almost all incomes when there are two agents and at most four chores, but not when there are five or more chores.
Three or more agents
Unfortunately, the positive results for three agents do not hold for chores, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 8 With n ≥ 3 agents and m ≥ 1 chores, there exists an additive monotonicallydecreasing preference-profile and a positive-measure subset of the income-space, where no allocation is CE-fair (hence no CE exists).
Proof Let ∈ ℝ n − be the vector of incomes, with:
There is one "hard" chore denoted by z. The agents' preferences are identical, monotonically-decreasing, and contain the following relations over the chores:
Note that these preferences are additive. For example, the value of z can be −2 2m and the values of the other chores can be −2, −4, −8, …. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a CE-fair allocation . Let i ∈ N be the agent who gets the hard chore z. By assumption t i > 2t 1 , and n ≥ 3 implies that 2t 1 ≥ ∑ j≠i t j (the
left-hand side contains at least two negative terms, each of which is at most t 1 ). But i prefers all other chores over his bundle X i , which contains the hard chore. So (P1) is violated for i:
Babaioff, Nisan and Talgam-Cohen study several settings besides the ones mentioned in previous sections. First, they study the setting of two agents with additive preferences and an arbitrary number of goods [12] . They present several sufficient conditions by which a CE exists for almost all incomes, such as: identical preferences and arbitrary incomes, or arbitrary preferences and almost-equal incomes. The general case remains open. Second, they study other restricted preference domains besides additive preferences [11] , such as the so-called lexicographic, leveled, responsive, submodular, and more. They present a hierarchy of preference-domains and present existence results for some domains in the hierarchy.
CE with indivisible items
A neat review of the different computational problems related to CE can be found in Appendix C of Babaioff et al. [10] . Deng et al. [31] study an Arrow-Debreu market. This is a generalization of the Fisher market studied in the present paper, in which each agent may be both a buyer and a seller, i.e., each agent may bring to the market an initial set of items to sell, rather than just an initial income. They assume that all items are goods, and all agents have additive preferences. They prove that deciding whether a CE exists is NP-hard even if there are 3 agents. They present an approximation algorithm which relaxes the CE conditions in two ways: (1) The bundle allocated to each agent is valued at least (1 − ) of the optimum given the prices, and (2) at least a fraction (1 − ) of the items are allocated. Both these relaxations are unrelated to our setting, in which the preferences are ordinal and all items must be allocated.
Bouveret and Lemaître [21] present a scale of five fairness criteria for allocating indivisible goods among agents with equal entitlements and additive preferences. The weakest criterion in their scale is the maximin share guarantee (for all i ∈ N ∶ X i ⪰ i 1 n M ), and the strongest criterion is CE-from-equal-incomes (CEEI) . They asked what is the computational complexity of deciding whether a CEEI exists. This question was answered soon afterwards by Aziz [6] , who proved that the problem is weakly NP-hard when there are two agents and m items, and strongly NP-hard when there are n agents and 3n items. Brânzei et al. [26] further proved that even verifying whether a given allocation is a CEEI is co-NP-hard.
Brânzei et al. [26] study CEEI for the case in which the agents are single-minded: for each agent i there is a subset of goods D i ⊆ M , such that i strictly prefers all bundles that
contain D i to all bundles that do not contain D i , is indifferent between any two bundles that contain D i , and is indifferent between any two bundles that do not contain D i . In this case, verifying whether a given allocation is a CEEI is polynomial, but checking if a CEEI exists is co-NP-complete. Single-minded agents are further studied by Brânzei et al. [27] . In contrast to our setting, they assume that each good can come in multiple units. The main difference between k units of the same good, and k different goods that all agents consider to be equivalent, is that the k units of the same good are required (by definition) to have the same price. This restriction implies that the "income-exhaustion" requirement (H1) from Sect. 4.1 is no longer w.l.o.g.: Brânzei et al. [27] show an example in which (1) a CE where all agents exhaust their income does not exist, (2) a CE where some agents spend less than their income does exist. They call this solution CAEI-Competitive Allocation from Equal Incomes. Interestingly, in contrast to a CEEI, it is possible to find a CAEI (if one exists) in polynomial time.
Heinen et al. [37] extend the five-criteria scale of Bouveret and Lemaître [21] for k-additive preferences, in which each agent reports a value for each bundle of at most k items, and the values of larger bundles are determined by adding and subtracting the values of the basic bundles. They study both goods and chores. They show an example of an envyfree and Pareto-efficient allocation of goods, that is not a CE from equal incomes.
Budish [28] studies the most general setting in which agents can have arbitrary preference relations over bundles-there is no monotonicity assumption-the market can have a mixture of goods and chores. He presents a beautiful and practical approximate CEEI mechanism, which relaxes the CEEI conditions in two ways: (1) The agents' incomes are not exactly equal, and (2) a small number of items may have to be added or discarded (the motivating application is allocating course seats among students: usually it is possible to add a small number of seats to accommodate the demand). He proved that an approximate-CEEI always exists (although Othman et al. [52] later proved that the computation of approximate-CEEI is PPAD-complete). The first relaxation (1) is closely related to the concept of CE for almost all incomes. In fact, both models can be described as adding an arbitrarily small random perturbation to a given income-vector; in his model, the given vector has equal incomes, and in our model, the given vector can have non-equal incomes (that correspond to agents with different entitlements). Budish's second relaxation (2) make his solution less useful when the number of items is fixed.
Barman and Krishnamurthy [15] study Fisher markets of goods, in which all agents have additive preferences. They show that a fractional CE (where some goods are divided) can always be rounded to an integral CE (where goods remain indivisible), by changing the agents' incomes. The change in each income can be as high as the largest price of a good in the fractional CE. Thus, their paper does not answer the question whether a CE exists for almost all income-vectors.
Picking-sequences
Picking-sequences are common practical mechanisms for allocating indivisible items. They are favored in various real-life situations due to their simplicity, privacy and low communication complexity [20, 57, 58] .
In matching markets, in which each agent is entitled to exactly one item, a common mechanism is random serial dictatorship [1, 7, 13, 43] . This is a special case of a pickingsequence in which each agent has exactly one turn, and the sequence of turns is selected at random. In this setting, each agent has a simple dominant strategy and it is to pick the best remaining item (as in Lemma 4) . In contrast, in a general picking-sequence, an agent who has several non-consecutive turns usually has no dominant strategies. This motivates various works that study the strategic behavior of agents in picking sequences.
Brams and Kaplan [24] and Brams [23] study picking-sequences for allocating cabinet ministries among parties. There is a coalition of parties; each party has a different number of seats in the parliament; larger parties should be allocated more ministries, or more prestigious ministries. This is an interesting use-case of fair division with different entitlements. A possible solution to this problem is to determine a picking-sequence, based on the different entitlements, and let each party pick a ministry in turn. Such a solution is used in Northern Ireland, Denmark and the European parliament [51] .
Brams and Kaplan assume that all items are goods, each agent has a strict ordering on the items, and has responsive preferences over bundles. This means that replacing an item in a bundle by a preferred item, always results in a preferred bundle. Responsive preferences are a strict superset of additive preferences and a strict subset of the monotonic preferences studied in this paper [10] . With responsive preferences, at each point in the picking-sequence, there is a single remaining item which the picking agent most prefers. An agent can be "truthful" and pick this best item, or be "strategic" and pick another item based on his knowledge of the other agents' preferences. Brams and Kaplan [24] prove several results that may be relevant for future development of pixeps: (1) With two agents, both truthful and strategic choices lead to Pareto-efficient allocations in SPE. Moreover, the game is monotonic in the following sense: if an agent's turns are moved earlier in the sequence, then the agent's bundle in SPE improves (e.g, Alice is better-off in an SPE of ABBA than in an SPE of BABA). (2) Both properties are still true with three or more truthful agents. But with three or more strategic agents, a picking-sequence might have an SPE that is not Pareto-efficient. Moreover, the game might be non-monotonic, i.e, an agent who is allowed to pick earlier in the sequence, might have a worse bundle in SPE. (3) For two agents, a simple modification of the picking-sequence game leads to a mechanism in which picking truthfully is a dominant strategy (see Kalinowski et al. [39] for a formal proof). This makes it easier to find pixeps that implement a CE, since an agent who picks truthfully never wants a dominated bundle.
Kohler and Chandrasekaran [42] present a linear-time algorithm to compute a SPE in the special case in which there are n = 2 agents, any number of goods, and the pickingsequence is alternating (ABABAB...). Kalinowski et al. [39] generalize this algorithm to any picking-sequence for n = 2 . They prove that, when n is unbounded, there can be exponentially many SPE, and finding even one of them is PSPACE-hard.
Aziz et al. [8] study the picking-sequence as a one-shot game, rather than as a sequential game. They assume that the agents report their entire ranking of the items to the principal, and the principal then picks, for each agent, his/her most preferred remaining item. They present a linear-time algorithm for computing a pure Nash equilibrium of this one-shot game. They do not discuss whether the Nash equilibrium is also a competitive-equilibrium, or whether it satisfies any notion of fairness. They assume that all agents have additive preferences, and all items are goods.
Another line of work related to picking-sequences asks how to select a picking-sequence that maximizes some global objective. Bouveret and Lang [20] study this question under the assumption that all items are goods, all preferences are additive, and moreover, there is a single known common scoring-function that relates the rank of an item in an agent's ranking to its value for the agent. The allocator does not know the ranking of each agent, but knows that all rankings are random draws from a given probability distribution. The allocator's goal is to maximize the expected value of some social welfare function. They show picking-sequences that maximize the expected utilitarian welfare (sum of values) or the expected egalitarian welfare (minimum value) in various settings. Kalinowski et al. [38] show that, for two agents with a specific scoring-function called Borda scoring [64] , when each ranking is equally probable, the alternating sequence (ABABAB...) attains the maximum expected utilitarian welfare. Algorithms 2 and 3 in this paper offer each agent in turn a possible pixep, and allow the agent to accept or reject that pixep. If the agent accepts, the pixep is played; otherwise, the protocol offers another pixep to another agent. This is similar but not identical to an alternating-offers protocol for negotiation between two players. In an alternating-offers protocol, the players themselves make the offers: each player suggests a possible outcome until an agreement is reached [2, 3, 32 ].
Fairness with unequal entitlements
As shown in Sect. 3, competitive equilibrium with unequal incomes can be regarded as a rule for fair allocation of items among agents with unequal entitlements. Fair allocation with unequal entitlements has been studied in some recent papers.
Farhadi et al. [33] study allocation of indivisible goods in a cardinal model, in which the preferences of each agent i are represented by an additive function V i . They define the weighted maximin share of agent i. Their definition, translated to the notation of this paper, reads:
Intuitively, the partition is the fairest partition that agent i could suggest if all agents had the same valuation function V i . An allocation is called WMMS-fair if V i (X i ) ≥ WMMS i for all i ∈ N . WMMS-fairness is fundamentally different than CE-fairness: WMMS depends on the cardinal values that the agents assign to the items, while the CE-fairness properties (P1) and (P2) depend only on the agents' ordinal rankings of the bundles. The cardinal and ordinal fairness conditions are independent and do not imply each other.
To see that WMMS-fairness does not imply CE-fairness, consider an instance in which all entitlements are equal. Then WMMS i = V i 1 n M , so WMMS-fairness is equivalent to maximin-share fairness. Suppose further that there are m = n goods and all agents have the same valuations. Then, the WMMS of all agents is the smallest value of a good, so every allocation that gives a single good to each agent is WMMS-fair. However, no allocation is envy-free, hence no allocation is CE-fair.
To see that CE-fairness does not imply WMMS-fairness, consider an instance with n = 2 agents with entitlements a = 98 and b = 2 . Suppose there are m = 3 goods x, y, z that Alice values at 49, 49, 2 and Bob values at 98, 2, 0. Hence, WMMS A ≥ 98 ⋅ 1 = 98 . Similarly, Bob's WMMS partition is (xz, y) so WMMS B ≥ 2 ⋅ 1 = 2 . It is impossible to give both agents their WMMS share, so a WMMS-fair allocation does not exist. However, a CE does exist. For example, giving all goods to Alice and pricing them at a/3 is a CE, hence the allocation is CE-fair.
Farhadi et al. [33] present an algorithm that guarantees each agent i a value of at least 1 n WMMS i , and prove it may be impossible to guarantee more. Aziz et al. [9] extend this research to allocation of indivisible chores among agents with additive preferences. In this setting the values and the WMMS i are negative numbers. They present an algorithm that guarantees to each agent i a value of at least n ⋅ WMMS i , and prove that it may be impossible to guarantee more than 4 3 ⋅ WMMS i even for two agents. They show improved approximation ratios for some special cases.
Fair division with unequal entitlements has also been studied in cake-cutting; see Cseh and Fleiner [30] , Segal-Halevi [56] and the references therein. In this setting, M is a continuous resource, usually represented by an interval and called "cake". Each agent i has a non-atomic measure V i over the measurable subsets of M . Non-atomicity implies that, for each agent i ∈ N and each integer d ≥ 1 , each bundle Z can be partitioned into d subsets of equal value to i. Hence,
. There are two common fairness criteria for cake-cutting with different entitlements.
. It implies property (P1) for K = N , but not for other K. For example, suppose there are three additive agents with equal entitlement. Suppose Alice values her bundle at 2, Bob's bundle at 3 and Carl's bundle at 1. Then the allocation is -proportional for her, but does not satisfy (P1) e.g. for K = {Bob} and l = d = 1 . The same example shows that -proportionality does not imply (P2), for example with l A = l C = 0, l B = d B = 1. 2. -envy-freeness [54] means that for all i, j ∈ N : V i (X i ) ≥
Apportionment methods
The apportionment problem is the problem of allocating seats in a legislature body among different groups in proportion to their size [14] . Examples include allocating seats in the USA congress among the states in proportion to their population, or allocating seats in a parliament among political parties in proportion to the number of ballots they received in the elections. This is a special case of fair allocation with unequal entitlements, where the items are the seats and the entitlements are the population sizes or the ballot counts. In this special case, All items are identical, all agents have identical additive preferences, and the value of each bundle equals the bundle size.
A full treatment of apportionment methods is beyond the scope of the present paper; see Biró et al. [18] , Kóczy et al. [41] for recent surveys. However, one method is particularly related to CE for almost all incomes, and it is the method developed by D'Hondt in 1882. 20 Denote by S the total number of seats to allocate. For each party i ∈ N , denote by t i its number of ballots and by s i the number of seats allocated to it. Initially, all s i are set to 0. Then a seat is allocated to a party i ∈ N for which the quotient t i ∕(s i + 1) is largest, and its s i is increased by 1. This repeats until finally ∑ i∈N s i = S . Suppose that the vector of ballot-counts is such that there are no identities of the kind: for any two integers k i , k j ∈ {1, … , S} and any two indices i ≠ j. 21 Then, at each step, there is a single i for which the quotient t i ∕(s i + 1) is largest. Let j be the party who gets the last seat, and denote p ∶= t j ∕s j . Then the allocation (s 1 , … , s n ) with the price p for every seat is a CE. This is because, for all parties i ∈ N : so at a price of p per seat, each party can afford its own bundle ( s i seats) but cannot afford any larger bundle ( s i + 1 seats).
The identities (1) hold only for a subset of measure zero of ℝ n + , so if could be an arbitrary vector in ℝ n + , then one could say that a CE exists for almost all incomes. However, is in fact a vector of integers (ballot-counts), and all elements of are bounded by the total number of voters. Hence the set of possible vectors is finite, so the identities (1) hold for a positive fraction of this set. However, ties such as (1) are never encountered in real-life apportionment scenarios [40] , so practically, a CE always exists.
The above discussion implies that the D'Hondt seat allocation is CE-fair. In particular, applying (P1) with K = N and d = S = the total number of seats implies that, if a party received at least a fraction l/S of the total number of ballots, then it must get at least the l-out-of-S maximin-share of the S seats, which is at least l seats. This property is called the lower Hare-quota. It is a known property of the D'Hondt's method [53, Section 11.4 ]. But D'Hondt's method satisfies all the other instantiations of (P1) and (P2), which-as far as I know-was not noted before. 20 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the connection between the D'Hondt method and CE. The method of D'Hondt has many variants that arrive at the same final outcome using a different algorithm. Some of them are the Jefferson method in the USA and the Bader-Ofer system in Israel. See e.g. Flis et al. [34] . 21 I am grateful to user Wolfram here: https ://math.stack excha nge.com/q/21183 49/29780 for suggesting this restriction.
It is interesting whether there are other apportionment rules that implement a CE-fair allocation, and whether the existence result extends to settings in which different seats may have different values.
Fairness in subgame-perfect equilibrium
Most works on fair division either ignore strategic considerations altogether, or look for truthful allocation mechanisms-mechanisms that implement a fair outcome in dominant strategies. I am aware of only few works that consider implementation of a fair outcome in subgame-perfect equilibrium:
• Moore and Repullo [46] show that, in general, various outcomes that cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium, can be implemented in SPE. One such outcome is the competitive equilibrium in a market of divisible resources (Sect. 6.3). • Nicolò and Yu [49] present an algorithm for dividing a heterogeneous divisible resource ("cake") between two agents, where the SPE is Pareto-efficient and envy-free; • Nicolò et al. [50] present an algorithm for the same setting, where the SPE satisfies a different fairness property known as equal-opportunity equivalence; • Nicolò and Velez [48] present an algorithm for allocating a single indivisible item with monetary compensation between two agents, where the SPE is a unique allocation that would be obtained by a balanced market.
I am not aware of SPE implementations of fair allocation of indivisible items without money.
In this paper, the subgame-perfect equilibrium was mainly used as a tool to prove the existence of a CE, so it was sufficient to prove that there exists a SPE which is also a CE. In economic terms, the algorithms in this paper provide a weak implementation of CE. A possible direction for future work is finding mechanisms in which every SPE is a CE, i.e., mechanisms that provide a strong implementation of CE.
Besides subgame-perfect equilibrium, one could try to implement a CE using other solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium (in a direct revelation game), self-confirming equilibrium [35] or rationalizable equilibrium [17] .
Future work

Restricted preference domains
In the domains of monotonically-increasing and monotonically-decreasing preferences, we now know all the pairs (n, m) for which a CE is guaranteed to exist for almost all incomes. But for restricted preference domains, the question remains open. In particular, for n = 2 or n = 3 agents with additive preferences, when there are m ≥ 5 goods, it is open whether CE exists for almost all incomes. Note that the preferences in the negative result of Theorem 6 (for n = 2, m = 5 ) are not additive:
• For Alice, we had xyz ≻ vxy, vxz, vyz, wxy, wxz, wyz ; with additive preferences, this implies that each of x, y, z is preferred to each of v, w, which implies xy ≻ vw , which implies xyz ≻ vw ; but we had vw ≻ xyz -a contradiction.
• For Bob, we had vx, vy, vz, wx, wy, wz ≻ vw ; with additive preferences, this implies that each of x, y, z is preferred to each of v, w. But we had vxy, vxz, vyz, wxy, wxz, wyz ≻ xyz , which implies the opposite.
Babaioff et al. [10] provide several sufficient conditions for existence in the case of 2 agents with additive preferences, but a general solution is still not known. Theorem 7 implies that, whenever a CE exists for two agents with additive preferences, the same is true for both goods and chores.
Finding pixeps automatically
The pixeps in this paper were found manually. It may be useful to build a program for automatically finding pixeps in domains in which the existence of CE is not settled yet (for example, two agents with additive preferences). When the number of items is sufficiently small, it may be possible to check all picking-sequences, for each one of them calculate prices that satisfy the heuristics (H1, H2, H3) for some subset of the income-space, and finally check whether the entire income-space is covered. 22 Unfortunately, while such a program may help to prove the existence of CE, it cannot be used to prove non-existence. As shown in the following example, some competitive equilibria cannot be a SPE of a pixep satisfying the decreasing-prices heuristic.
Example 2 There are 4 goods and 2 agents with incomes (a, b) = (8, 7) . The agents' preferences contain the following relations:
Consider the allocation (A, B) = (wz, xy) . It is a CE, for example, with price-vector (p w , p x , p y , p z ) = (6, 4, 3, 2) . Note that p x > p z and p y > p z . This is necessary for a CE, since otherwise Alice could afford wx or wy, which she prefers to wz. Note also that p w > p x and p w > p y . This is also necessary for a CE in which agents exhaust their incomes, since p w = a − p z > b − p y = p x and similarly p w > p y .
If such a CE could be a SPE of a pixep with decreasing-prices, then the sequence should be ABBA. But the allocation (wz, xy) is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this sequence: in SPE, Alice picks x first, since then Bob picks yz and Alice gets wx, which she prefers to wz. ◻ Thus, the challenge of automatically solving the question of CE existence for almost incomes remains open.
Lemma 10
(1) There is an instance with n = 2 additive agents such that, for one agent, some allocation satisfies all instantiations of (P1) but violates an instantiation of (P2); (2) There is an instance with n = 2 additive agents such that, for one agent, some allocation satisfies all instantiations of (P2) but violates an instantiation of (P1).
Proof There are two agents with incomes a, b satisfying:
(e.g. a = 9, b = 4 ). Each part of the lemma is proved by a different instance. 
Appendix 3: Existence of CE: alternative definitions
The existence results in most of the paper were based on Definition 3, which requires that:
(*) For almost all income-vectors, for all preference-profiles, a CE exists.
By changing the quantifiers, one could come up with several alternative definitions:
(**) For all income-vectors, for almost all preference-profiles, a CE exists. (***) For all preference-profiles, for almost all income-vectors, a CE exists. (****) For almost all preference-profiles, for all income-vectors, a CE exists.
Definitions (**) and (****) are both equivalent to "for all income-vectors, for all preference/profiles, a CE exists". This is because the space of preference-profiles is discrete and finite, so even a single preference-profile constitutes a positive fraction of this space. Therefore they cannot be guaranteed even for two agents and one item. Definition (*) clearly implies (***). 25 At first glance, definition (***) is weaker than (*), since it allows the set of excluded incomes (for which CE is allowed to not exist) to depend on the preference-profile. For example, consider the following hypothetic claim: "If Alice prefers x to y, then CE exists whenever a ≠ b ; if Alice prefers y to x, then CE exists whenever a ≠ 2b ". Formally, this claim fits definition (***) but not definition (*).
However, because the number of preference-profiles is finite, the two definitions are in fact equivalent: for each preference-profile, the set of excluded incomes has zero measure, and the union of a finite number of such sets still has zero measure. For example, the above claim implies that "CE exists whenever a ≠ b and a ≠ 2b , for all preference-profiles", which formally fits definition (*). 26 A ⪰ 1 2 A ⊔ 1 2 B = {x, z} 24 A property that captures this issue is: "if b > (a − b) + b∕2 , then for every partition of A into two parts A 1 ∪ A 2 , Bob prefers B either to A 1 , or to A 2 ∪ 1 2 B ". This condition is much less natural than properties (P1) and (P2), and it is not clear how to generalize it. 25 This is a general fact. For every predicate P(x, y), the statement "For-almost-all x ∈ X for-all y ∈ Y P(x, y)" implies "for-all y ∈ Y for-almost-all x ∈ X P(x, y)". 26 This is also a general fact. If the set Y is finite, then the statement "For-almost-all x ∈ X for-all y ∈ Y P(x, y)" is equivalent to "for-all y ∈ Y for-almost-all x ∈ X P(x, y)".
(a) If a CE exists with n + 1 agents, for almost-all income-vectors in ℝ n+1 + and all preference-profiles in n+1,m , then a CE exists with n agents, for almost-all income-vectors in ℝ n + and all preference-profiles in n,m . (b) If a CE-fair allocation exists with n + 1 agents, for almost-all income-vectors in ℝ n+1 + and all preference-profiles in n+1,m , then a CE-fair allocation exists with n agents, for almost-all income-vectors in ℝ n + and all preference-profiles in n,m .
So far I could not prove any of these conjectures.
Appendix 6: Proof comparison
This section compares two proofs to the corresponding proofs of Babaioff et al. [10] .
Theorem 1: Existence of CE with 3 goods
Babaioff et al. [11, Proposition 3.1] prove this theorem by partitioning the income-space into five sub-spaces (instead of two). While they do not use pixeps, their algorithm for finding a CE in these sub-spaces can be, approximately, presented by the following pixeps: Else:
4. If a = b + c then play the sequential game below:
A a/2 .
The income-subspaces of steps 1, 2, 3, 5 are covered by the two steps of Algorithm 1, but step 4 handles the set of incomes with a = b + c , which is not covered by Algorithm 1. I omitted it since it has a measure of zero, so it is not required for proving the existence of CE for almost all incomes.
Here is a proof that step 4 indeed implements a CE. First, note that the decreasingprices condition is satisfied since a > b > c and 2b > b + c = a . By Lemma 4 no agent wants a dominated bundle. Bob has an unrelated bundle only in the second pixep, and he cannot afford it. It remains to check the unrelated bundles of Alice. Rename the items such that Alice's best item is x. If Bob's best item is not x, then Alice certainly plays BAA, since then she gets x plus another item. She obviously prefers this bundle to her only unrelated bundle, which is Bob's single item. If Bob's best item is x, then Alice effectively chooses between x (the ABC sequence) and yz (the BAA sequence). Whatever she chooses, she does not want the other (unrelated) bundle.
Theorem 6: Non-existence of CE with 5 goods
Babaioff et al. [11, Theorem 3.5] prove this theorem using a very similar example. With the transformation A → v, B → w, C → x, D → y, E → z , the preferences implied by the numeric values in their Example 3.1 are:
The preferences are very similar, but they contain some indifferences between bundles (which do not affect the proof in any way). I just expressed the preferences as relations and without numbers, and also did not specify some relations that are irrelevant for the proof.
The main differences between the proofs are: (a) the proof in this paper uses only the fairness properties, so the impossibility result is stronger-it shows that even the fairness properties alone cannot be satisfied; (b) the proof in this paper is extended to any number n ≥ 2 of agents.
Appendix 7: Allocations in different subgame-perfect equilibria
As noted in Sect. 5, some pixeps may have several different subgame-perfect equilibria, where only one of these SPE leads to a competitive equilibrium. Currently I do not have a general algorithm for determining the SPE that leads to a CE. However, the following lemma shows that, with strict preferences, the SPE selection affects only the prices and not the allocation.
Lemma 12
Suppose all agents have strict preferences. Then for any two subgame-perfect equilibria Q 1 , Q 2 of the same pixep S, the allocations (S, Q 1 ) and (S, Q 2 ) are the same.
Proof
The proof is by induction on n. For n = 1 the claim is trivial. For n > 1 , assume the claim for all pixeps with n − 1 agents, and consider two SPE of a pixep with n agents. Suppose w.l.o.g. that the first choice that differs between Q 1 and Q 2 is made by Alice. If Alice's bundle in Q 1 differs from her bundle in Q 2 , then (by strictness of preferences) she prefers one of these bundles; but then the other one cannot be a SPE. So Alice must get the same bundle in Q 1 and Q 2 . Therefore, we can remove Alice from the sequence and remove her bundle from the set of items and get a new pixep with n − 1 agents; by the induction assumption, all these agents have the same bundle in both equilibria. ◻ Lemma 12 implies, in particular, that the resulting SPE allocation is CE-fair, since CEfairness depends only on the allocation; the price-vector is used only as an evidence that the allocation is a CE.
In general, Lemma 12 does not hold for a sequential choice among several pixeps. For example, in the game "Alice chooses between AB and AC", there are two SPEs with substantially different allocations. However, the lemma does hold in the specific sequential games in Algorithms 2 and 3:
• In Algorithm 2 there are only two agents: if Alice's bundle is the same in both SPEs then obviously Bob's bundle is the same too. The same is true in Algorithm 3 Range 4. • In Algorithm 3 Range 5, Alice cannot be indifferent between her two choices, since in each choice she gets a different bundle (a singleton vs. a pair), and by assumption the preferences are strict. The same is true in Range 7. In Range 6, too, Alice's choice is between a singleton and a pair, and Bob's choice is between a pair and a singleton, so they cannot be indifferent. This means that a unique pixep is played in every SPE.
Lemma 12 does not hold with non-strict preferences. For example, suppose there are two items x, y, Alice is indifferent between them while Bob strictly prefers y. Then the picking-sequence AB has two SPEs-one in which Alice picks x and one in which she picks y-and they lead to two different allocations that are substantially different for Bob.
